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Of Patriar chy Born:

The Politic al Economy of Fertili ty Decisio ns *

Ever since Malthus condemned the brutish ness of a workin g class
that mindle ssly reprodu ced itself, social scient ists have had
a tendenc y to

assume that reprod uctive behavi or could not be readily explain ed by
ration al motive s.

Even thqsc willing to concede the existen ce of intel

ligent choice in modern indust rial societ ies have continu ed to assume
that
familie s in underde veloped agraria n societ ies are bound by traditi onal
and often irratio nal attitud es.

The advent of conscio us family size

limita tion is often picture d as the simple result of a process of modern
i
zation .
While assump tions such as these still hold sway in the field of
detoogr aphy, ~4ny demogr aphers have begun to challen ge them.

Confro nted with

the crnpiric aJ. reality that familie s in many rural areas of the develo
ping
world enjoy econom ic advanta ges from large familie s, they have increa
sing
ly focusse d their attenti on. on the costs and benefi ts of childre n.

A

number of new empiri cal studies have substa ntiated the claim that childre
n
.
~ .,. . .
.
~
..
.
can and do provide import
ant pec\.nn.. ar.1 eonLr:t
oucions co
raru11.y
l.ncome . 1

There are rationa l econom ic motiva tions for high fertili ty.
The extent to which purely econom ic factors affect fertili ty
decisio ns remains unclea r, but it is increa singly eviden t that the answer
s
to this questio n hinges on the answer s to two other questio ns:

What are the

releva nt econom ic factors , and how can they best be concep tualize d?

In the

growing literat ure on the ration ality of high fertili ty, two· distin ct
theore ti
cal perspe ctives are emergin g.

The first perspe ctive represe nts an extens ion

of conven tional neocla ssical models of househ old decisio n making , often

-2described as "the new household economics."

This perspective has been

specifically applied to the economic incentives to high fertility by
Robert Evenson and Mark Rosenzweig. 2

The second perspective lies outside

of the tradition of neoclassical economic theory.

Rnther than focusing

on the characterisics of individual households, it underlines the importance

of the institutional context in which individual households operate.

It

points to the importance of patriarchy, a form of social inequality based
on age and sex.

Cardwen.

This perspective is best represented by the work of John

3

Proponents of both these theoretical perspectives have made important
contributions to our understanding of fertility decisions.

But neither

perspective provides a satisfactory framework for analyzing the costs
and benefits of children and the ways in which these are affected by the
process of economic development.

Neoclassical models ignore non-market

factors, such as patriarchy, which affect

transfers of income and labor

time between men and women, parents and children.

Institutionalist

approaches correctly emphasize these factors, 'but do not precisely explain
their economic dimensions nor clearly describe their specific effects
on household decisions.
In this paper, I develop a critique of both these perspectives
which I hope will lay the foundation for a political economy of fertility
decisions.

My critical analysis of neoclassical economic assumptions repre

sents.a clarification and a formalization of the insights of institutional
theories, but leads toward some significant modifications of the institution
al approach.

Utilizing some of the tools of both Marxist and feminist theory,

I develop three related hypotheses:
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(1) The economic benefits of children are determined jointly by
household specific factors such as levels of wealth and education and
by institutional factors such as patriarchal control over children--cont rol
~hich parents exercize over the labor and income of adult, as well as
immature children.
(2)

The economic costs of children, a large part of which

consist of the opportunity rost of the mother's time, are determined
jointly by household specific factors such as levels of wealth and
education and by forms of patriarchal control over women which limit their
bargaining power in the household and lower their real income.
(3)

Both these aspects of patriarchal control are rooted in the

stn,cture of ownership of the means of production and can be expected to
change in predictable ways as the class structure changeB.

Any theory

of patriarchal control and its effects on the demographic transaction
must include a detailed consideration of the class structure and its trans
formation through the transition to capitalism.

Neoclassical Approaches:

A

Critique

The hallmark of neoclassical economics is its emphasis
importance of individual choice.

on the

The distinguishing feature of the "new

household economics" is its extension of the calculus of constrained
optimization to family decision making. 4

The household is pictured as

a market within a market, with its own production function, its own
utility function, its own supply curve, and its own demand curve.

Al

though there are no formal prices assigned to inputs or outputs in the
household, family members make decisions on the basis of implicit prices,
some of which may be imputed from market prices.
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Family members share a joint utility function which they seek
to maximize.

This joint utility function may be the outcome of agreement

among all family members, or it may be imposed on the family by its own
benevolent dictator.

The tastes and preferences defined in this utility

fnnction determine the family's demand for goods produced within the
household as well as outside it.

Families choose the combination of

market purchased and home produced goods, and organize home. production
in the most efficient way possible, given prices and incomes.

The

household production function is commonly assumed to be of a fixed
coefficient or constant returns to scale type, and to exclude the
possibility of joint productio1.
Own children cannot be purchased on the market, and must be
produced at home.

Within the neoclassical fr~mework, the demand

for children is derived from the demand for child "services".

These

services include the flow of utility which children provide as well as
any pecuniary transfers.

The quantity of services which a child

provides is determined by its "quality,"

a

term defined economically as

the amount of time and money invested in the child.

This distinction

between quantity and quality laysthe foundation for the claim that
parentsr demand for children may go down even if their demand for
child "services" remains the same.
quantity.

6

Parents may substitute quality for

Traditionally, children are described as consumer durables,

yielding a flow of "utility" over their lifetime.

More recent formula

tions, such as those of Evenson and Rosenzweig, accomodate the possibility that children may also be investment goods, yielding a flow of income
over their lifetime.
in the model.

This modification has stimulated no basic changes

-5-

As many critics have noted, the basic assumptions of the

neoclassica l approach are restrictive and unrealistic . 7 · The joint
utility function assumes away the possibility of conflict between the
sexes or between the generations .

The household production function

is specified in terms that are empirically tractable, rather than
empirically believable. 8

The quantity-qu ality trade off treats child

services in a reductionis tic way, assuming that parents get back from
children in utility or income some quantity proportiona l to the amount
of time and money that they have invested.

If this were the case,

children truly would be reliable ~.QJl?umer durables and risk free invest
ment goods.

Only mortality could curtail their be~efits.

The significanc e of these specific criticisms should not be under
estimated.

Keither should they be used as an excuse for premature

rejection of neoclassica l models.

Any economic analysis of the house

hold requires some simplifying assumptions .

Sensitive to the weaknesses

of their models, most practitione rs of the new home economics argue that
they nonetheless generate useful and testable hypotheses.

Even th~sewho

reject their conclusions may have something to learn from their empiri
cally oriented research.
The real weakness of the neoclassici sts lies not in the
way they analyze what they analyze, but in the way certain factors are
systematica lly reglected. 8

Individuals and families do make choices in

response to prices which are determined through markets.
are made in a specific economic context.

But these choices

They are constrained by the

resources or endowments which define the domain of choice, and these
constraints are determined by non-market economic factors.

-6From a neoclassical perspective, the only·non-market factors relevant
to choices are tastes and preferences.

Any market outcome which appears

inconsistent with the theory of optimization or rational choice is ex
plained by reference to tastes and preferences.

Thus, discrimination,

a practice which is inefficient from a purely economic point of view,is
explained as the result of a "taste" for discrimination.

The fact that

increases in income tend to lead to decreases in desired family size is
anomalous, since increases in income are normally assumed to increase
demand for goods.

This anomaly is reconciled by the assumption that high

income increases the demand for child quality rather than quantity.
Tastes and preferences certainly do exist, and do affect the
process of market choice.
preferences on the market.

But people do not exchange tastes and
They exchange goods and services.

cannot exchanie what they do not own or control.

They

The starting point

of any process of exchange is the distribution of endowments.
Initial endowments could theoretically be distributed by a
market mechanism.

In reality, they are not.

On the historical level

they are determined by political forces and political conflict, which
include forms of physical coercion.

On the individual level, they

are deter.mined by the-family into which one is born, and the skills
and capital which are transferred by the previous generation.
Intergenerational transfer does not take place through a market
process,

Parents may choose the number of children they will have

and the quantity of capital they will transfer to them.

They cannot

-7and do not choose the childr en thems elves, and i_f they are
dissa tisfie d

with their oYO childr en they canno t and do not trade them.

Childr en, it

must also be noted, do not choose their paren ts, and the endowm
ents
of capita l which they receiv e are seldom relate d to any of
their intrin sic
chara cteris tics.
Parent s transf er resour ces to their own childr en simply becaus
e
they are their o~'ll childr en.
nature .

Such transf ers are often recipr ocal in

Childr en also transf er resour ces to their paren ts, espec ially

when they become old and infirm .
ensure s that these

But there is no marke t proces s that

transf ers will be equal or recipr ocal.

Paren ts

may transf er less to childr en than they receiv e, and vice versa.

Paren ts

may transf er 100re to boys than to girls, and vice versa.
These aspect s of interg enera tional transf er affect marke t outco~
e~,
becaus e they determ ine what female s in partic ular and chil<lr
en in genera l
bring to the marke t.

Childr en, as they mature , may make certai n choice s

which are perfec tly ration al, but quite distin ct from the choice
s they
would have made if they had differ ent endowm ents.

This simple , even

self-e viden t point is aptly illust rated by a consid eratio n
of the factor s
which affect the costs and benef its of childr en.
One of the major determ inants of the cost of childr en is the
cost
of a mothe r's time.

Time which women devote to childc are is time they

could have utiliz ed to perfor m some other type of work.

The oppor tunity

cost of childr en is clearl y affect ed by women 's produ ction
in the home
and her earnin gs

in the marke t.

Neocl assica l econom ists assume that

this oppor tunity cost, or "shado w wage" is determ ined throug
h a marke t.
Women are willin g to supply a certai n amoun t of labor at a
certai n price
and both the formal labor marke t and the indivi dual househ old
demand a
certai n amoun t of labor at a certai n price.

The price of a woman 's time

should be determ ined by the inters ection of supply and deman
d.

-8-

The neoclassical approach focuses on household specific factors,
such as levels of education and household capital that should explain
differences in time allocation between households in terms of a market
like process of choice.

It avoids consideration of the way in which non

market factors affect the supply and the demand for female labor.

If

employers have a "taste for discrimination" their demand for women's
labor is lowered.

If parents and schools make different types of

transfers to sons and daughters, the supply of female labor is different
than the supply of male labor.

Suppose that the skills and other "endowments" which women receive
are different from men's, but equivalent in value.

One would expect to

find women specializing in certain tasks, but receiving the same hourly
wage as men.

It they don't receive equal pay for their work despite

the fact that they are supplying the sa~c level of skill, employers are
discriminating against them.

Discrimination in the market artifically

lowers women's earnings, leading them to devote more hours to household
production than ·would other.-1ise be the case.

t·lomen 's marginal _p-roduct

in the home is artifically lowered.
Women may also be discriminated against in the home, either in
their parent's horee (if they receive less in the form of endowments such
as education)or in their husband's home (if their share of total family
income is less than commensurate with their work).

As members of a

household men and women pool their resources and consume a certain share
of what the family as a whole produces.

There is no necessary relation

ship between the value of work performed and the share of household income
received.

Both men and women could, of course, choose to leave the house

hold if they did not receive their rightful share.

Both would have to
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face certain restrictions on mobility, such as marriage, divorce and child
custody laws, which may or may not affect them equally.
in the market places women in the weaker position.
clnminatPrl ~no <>xnlnit-er i-

But discrimination

Even if they are

the 1-.ousehnld, tJ,ey are 1iLely to be far

better off there than they would be on their own.
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If all women were equally discriminated against, both in the
relative value of their endowments and in the market wage rate, discrimination
per se would not affect cross-sectional differences between households, and
neoclassical predictions regarding the effects of differences in wealth
and education between households might be borne out

If levels of discrimi-

nation and distributions of endowments change over time, however, as they almost
certainly do, cross-sectional differences will not necessarily be reflected
in historical trends.
The neoclassical analysis of the pecuniary benefits of children also
overlooks

the non-market factors that define the context of parent's choices,

despite the fact that these factors are also likely to change over time.

~~eoclassi

cal models explain childrens remittances to parents in the same way that they

explain the opportunity cost of women· s time, as a function of variables whicl1
affect schooling

productivity and labor force participation.

They do not

explore the relationship between the child's earnings (which certainly are
significantly affected by the variables which they single out) and what the
child actually contributes to the household.

All but one of the models

specified by Evenson and Rosenzweig implicitly assume that there is a constant
relationship between potential and actual gains from children's work. 9

In

the remaining formulation, this relationship is modified by exogenous
depreciation over time due to migration. 10
The neoclassicists' lack of consideration of the gap between potential
and actual gains stems from their assumption that parents and children share
a common utility function.

The common utility function obscures the possibility
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that parents and childre n may have differe nt and conflic ting intere sts
and
may bargain over the extent and timing of transfe rs of income.

Young childre n

may share a conunon utility functio n--they exercis e no indepen dent choice
over the distrib ution of the family 's produc t.

Adoles cent and adult childre n;

howeve r, do exercis e some contro l over the dispos ition of their earning
s.

They

may choose to hand over far less than their parents anticip ated.
Neocla ssical models tend to overloo k relatio ns between parents and
childre n once childre n leave the househ old.

Yet Rosenzw eig himsel f notes

that the pecuni ary contrib utions of absent childre n may be particu larly
import ant in less develop ed countr ies. 11

Famili es which are "nucle ar" in

terms of househ old structu re may be quite "extend ed' in terms of flows
of
income heti.1een the genera tions.

It is adult childre n, not young childre n,

that parents rely on as a source of suppor t in old age.

Since women are

seldom capable of childbe aring after age 40, their younge st childre n
are usu
ally at least 20 years old by the time they reach ar,e 60.
This aspect of the family life cycle clearly affects the contex t of
parent al "invest m~nts" in childre n.

If parents have any pecunia ry intere st

in childre n, they are interes ted not only in what their childre n earn,
but
in what percen tage of their childre n's earning s they will receive .

Some

factor s, notably educat ion, decreas e childre n's contrib utio~ when young,
but increas e their potent ial contrib ution by providi ng them with access
to
better jobs.

Parent s must take into accoun t the possib ility that educat ion

(or other factors ) may directl y affect the percen tage transfe rred as
well
as the runount earned .
The way in which parents provide their childre n with their origin al
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endowments is quite crucial.

A dowry, which is often a conditional transfer,

differs significantly from a bequest, the timing of which is determined by
external events.

An endowment such as an education, which parents cannot

reclaim once it is provided, differs significantly from a right to work

family land, which they can easily revoke.

The choices which adult children

make regarding transfers to their parents are affected by past and anticipated
non-market transfers from their parents to them.
If it could be demonstrated that the percentage of income which children
contribute to their parents were relatively uniform across families and stable
over time, then analysis of children's productivity and earnings would provide
important insights into the pecuniary benefits of children.

a priori reason to assume that this is the case.

liut there is no

There are important differences

between far.1ilies in parental control over wealth, and important historical
changes have occurred in the timing and extent of intergenerational transfers.
In sum, institutional factors which influence the balance of power between
men and wonen and parents and children clearly affect the costs and benefits
of children.

Any theory \.:hich proposes to exilain fertility decline as - a

rational response to increases in the cost of children must consider the factors
which define the context in which individual choices are made.

To consider

these factors requires some theory of the way in which non-market ins ti tut ions
themselves evoke.
.!_nstitutional Approaches
Sociological and anthropological approaches to the family are
antithetical to neoclassical economic theory because they deemphasize
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the role of individual choice.

They focus either on the importance of

cultural attitudes--Qabeled as "tastes and preferences" in neoclassical
models), or on the role of social institutions in imposinr, constraints on
individual decisions.

There is tremendous heterogeneity in the way in

which the logic of human behavior is explored, but it almost always includes
a conceptualization of rational choices that

is distinct from individualistic

optimization.
Individuals live. and work in a social context.

But they do not

mindlessly conform to the received wisdom of traditional ways.

They play an

active role in processes of social change which modify and transform both
attitudes and institutiorts.

They choose to cooperate with others in promoting

or resisting change, and this form of choice is quite distinct from their
individual decisions to buy and sell, invest or divest .

The logic of group

behavior can seldom be summarized in the language of constrained optimization,
because it often requires a complicated strategy:

the outco~e of a market

exchange ca:1 be predicted, but the response of one group·s behavior to another
groups actions is always uncertain. 12
One of the central issues in social science--perhaps the most central
-is the definition of relevant groups.

Traditional sociological approaches

tend to emphasize the importance of groups defined by status and occupation;
anthropological approaches tend to look for cultural dividing lines; Marxist
theory

focuses on the roles of social classes defined by their relation

to the means of production.

All social scientists, including

demographers,

have tended to treat the family itself as a group with a clear community of

interest which was merely a constituent part of a larger group, such as
class.

The first serious critique of this conceptualization grew out of

-14-

feminist theory.

Though conflict between men and women has always been noticed,

described, and joked about, it has only recently been

recognized as a form

of conflict with far-reaching social implications.

The feminist insight has important implications for the analysis of
the family.

It raises important questions about the way in which family

decisions are made, and the way in which the context of family qecisions
is modified by historical change.

Many different theoretical approaches

to this question have been developed.

One emerging pa;adigm explores the

structure of relationships between the sexes in terms of the concept of
patriarchy.

13

In its common usage, patriarchy connotes male domination.
meaning, however, is "rule of.the fathers."

I ts etyr.ologi cal

A growing body of literature

examines relations between the generations in terms similar to those use~
to describe relations between the sexes.

Both these aspects of patrian.:l1y

are commonly analyzed within the larger context of the class structure of
a given mode of production.

The most significant effort to relate the concept of patriarchy to
the analysis of fertility decisions is John Caldwell's essay, "A Theory

of Fertility:

From High Plateau to 'les:abilization 11 •

14

In describing

the traditional rural family Caldwell points to the importance of non-market
factors which affect decision making in

the household.

"Familial modes

of production", he writes "are characterized by relations of production
between kin that give the more powerful or the decision makers material
a d vantage 11 • 15

In an explicit criticism of neoclassical assumptions, he

observes that the household decision makers are likely to be the old and
the male.
He correctly explains that there are many reasons why this may be

-15-

the case.

Elders have greater knowledge and experience than youths, and

males have greater physical strength than females.

Patriarchal ideologies

and religions reinforce elder males' claim to authority.

These authority

relations are further reinforced by strict sex role socialization within
the family.

But Caldwell also notes the importance of a specific set of

non-market economic factors : elder male ownership and control of the means
of production.
Caldwell does uot provide a comprehensive review of the evidence,
but his claims are consistent with a growing body of research on the social
history of the family.

One of the first modernization theorists to explore

the family, \·?illiam Goode, emphasized the mechanisro1s of parental authority.
Until industrialization parents in the hest could
control their children's choice of spouse largely
through control over inheritance, for land was
almost the only potential source of incone. The
farm youth could not marry without his father's
permission, because by his own effort, he could
not gain enough money with which to buy land.
Throughout most of the West, a dowry system was
followed, so that the girls' chances of marrying
were neglit'.ible unless her family w~s willing to
present her with a sufficient marriage gift.16

Berkner argues that adult sons in Austria often grew impatient
waiting to come into their inheritance.

Their dependence on their

fathers as a source of wealth reinforced their willingness to devote
labor or income to the care of their elderly parents.

Braun describes

the contributions which Swiss children made to their parents upkeep before
the advent of industrialization.

18

Scott and Tilly, describing France

in the 18th century, write that "In some cases parents formalized a working
daughter's responsibility to the family wage economy by arranging to receive
her wages from her employer".

Greven and Smith, among others, have

-16-

traced the evolution of parental control over children in early New England. 20
Patriarchs in many developing countries use their control over

land in a similar fashion.

There are several classic studies of patriarchal

control over children in Asia.

Wolf describes the strength of direct

control over children in Taiwan. 21

Cheung writes that, "until only a

f ew decades ago, parents in Ehina held property rights in chil d ren. .. 22

Cain's analysis of the household life cycle in Bangladesh suggests that
adult children are economicall y bound to their parents? 3 In a volume of
essays on the persistence of high fertility, Jones points out, ''in a
patriarchal social structure (e.g. much of West Africa and the ~oslem
World), the father can (and often does) keep sons unmarried until quite
a mature age, and even after they have married and perhaps tnken up
residence separately

the fruits of the son·s lnbour continue to flow

to the father in the sense that he maintains control over the land they

work.

.,24

Janet Salaff documents the flow of income from adult daughters to
their parents in Hong Konz. 25
Both parents may benefit from patriarchal control over children.

incessant demands of childcare have a much greater vested interest in their
children than do fathers.
the sexes.

But herein lies an essential difference between

Both parents may enjoy the fruits of their children's labor,

but mothers pay the most direct and the most personal costs.

This assy"ffiT1letry

has important implication s for relations between the sexes.
There are a numher of obvious motives for male domination.

Men

who wield greater economic and political power than women may directly benefit
from unequal exchanr,e. dcm3ndinr, more boods ancl services than they would
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otherwise receive.

But women's capacity for childbearing provides an

additional motive for male domination--men's potential benefit from their
children.

And women's biological potential provides an additional mechanism

for male domination.

Nothering makes women more physically vulnerable and

more economically dependent.

It enforces specialization in a form of pro

duction that requires a certain biological capacity and specific type of
socialization but utilizes relatively little skill or capital.

Mothering

tends to limit women's participation in the types of exchange and interaction
that are crucial to most forms of political activity.
Many aspects of patriarchal control over women are related to their
social role as mothers, and all fonns of patriarchal control affect women as
mothers.

Any woman I s decision to marry is affected by the viability of

alternatives to marriage.

Any woman's choice to bear a child is circunscribed

by her freedoY.J or lack of freedom to make an independent clwice.
Motivated in large part by feminist concerns, a growing literature
documents both his tori cal and contemporary fonns of inequality between the
sexes.

26

Thts research firmly establishes th_at, whatever its origins, this

inequality is strongly rooted in inequality in control and ownership of
wealth.

In preindustrial England and the United States, the wife and mother

of the family unit exercized no legal

or formal control over land.

A woman

sometimes gained legal control of land after her husband's death, but women
often held land only in trust for their children.

Unmarried women who in

herited property often received a guaranteed income from property held in
trust, or received money rather than land.
Sindlarly clearcut inequalities typify many areas of the developing

world.

There is tremendous variation in legal institutions regarding
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Table

1

Female Workers as a Percenta ge of Male Workers
in the Labor Force
(Female Workers ~ Male Workers x 100)

Total Labor Force

Employe rs, Own
Account Workers

Employe rs, O\ro
Account Workers
in
Agricul ture

Unpaid
Family
Workers

Countri es in which
Female ~orkers are
Between 20% anci 40%
of the Hale labor
Force
Argenti na, 1970
Bolivia , 1976
Chile, 1970
Ecuador , 1974
El Salvado r,1971
Mexico, 1977
Paragua y, 1972
Venezue la, 1977
India, 1971
Philippi ne.s, 1976
Malta, 1977
Netherl ancs, 1971
Fiji, 1976
C.Ountri cs in which
Female \,'orkers are
between 40% and 607.
of the Hale Labor
Force

34
29.5
29.6
20.4
27.6
29.6
27 .4
37.7
21.
31.8
35.2
35.
20.1

19.6
26.8
24.8
14.5
19 .4·
24.4
21.1
23.9
10.1
30.6
22.3
9.4
9.8

Puerto Rico, 1978

49.
42.2
.53. 9
49.6
51.7
57 .8
4 7 .5
55.3
59.6

16.1
16.1
19.7
32.2

Cyprus, 1976
Hong Konr., 1976
Indones ia, 1971
Israel, 1977
Republi c of Korea, 1977
Singapr e, 1977
Belgiqu e, 1977
France, 1975
ItalY
1977
New Zealanci , 1976

47.3
47.

17.3
32.8
30.9
43.6
18.5

13.3
3.4
3.,4
3.4
.6
7.
3.3
4.4
10.8
8.4
15.9
2.1
8.7

18.3
27.5
21.9
14.2
19.2
15.5
13.6
19.5

36.9
20.
14.8
28.2
33.3
12.0
53.l
27.
234.6
25.9

172.9
108.8
234. 6
126.8

478.4
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Table 1 , Continued

Employers, Own
Total Labor Force

Account Workers

Employers, Own
Account Workers
in
Agriculture

Unpaic
Fa1uily

Worker

Countries in ~hich
Female Workers are over
60% of Male Labor Force
U.S. 1977

Japan, 1977
Canada, 1973
Thailand, 1976
Austria, 1977
Bulgaria, 1975
Denrncrk, 1977
Finland, 1976
Federal Republic of
Genr..any
Hungary, 1975
Norvay, 1977
$'1,,•eden, 1977
United Kingdom, 1976

67.4
61.2
63.
62.4
62.1
88.
73.1
79.9
60.3
78.3
65.4
77 .6

60.9

30.7

35.2
31.8
81.8
41.7

11.3
26.7

25.2
43.
19.3
28.7
24 .6

8.
29.
6.5

19.8

412.9
354.5
193. 6

101.3

54.1
3.3
22.4
14.4
31.5
7.9
15.6

*Internatio nal Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1972

263. 3

376.9
257.7
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Table

2

Women's Wages as a Percentage of Men's Wages

World Manufacturing Employment*
Denmark
Burna (1976)
El Salvador
Netherlands
Norway
France
Finland
Germany
United King:iom
Greece
Syria
Egypt
Luxembourg
Ireland

86.5
82.4
80.5
80.3
79.8
75.8
74.2
72.6

70.9
68.8
68.7
64.4
62.4
62.5
World Agricultural Employment**

Austria
Malaysia
Norway (casual day laborers)
France (1976, per~anent laborers)
Ghana (1973, all agricultural workers)
Finland (general faruhands)
Sweden (all agricultural workers)
El Salvador (per:nan-::c.nt: laborers)

Morocco (1973, permanent and Eeasonal workers)
United Kingdom (1976, regular workers)
Sri Lanka
Grenada (1974, permanent laborers)
Republic of Korea
Portugal
Belgium

103.7
99.2
98.2
94.8
93.8
89.5
86.2
84.
80.
80

78.9
75.
72.1

69.5
62.9

*Yearbook of Labor Statistics, International Labour Offices,
Geneva, 1978. Figures for 1977 unless otherwise noted.
**Figures for ar,ricultural workers, 1977 unless otherwise no~ed.
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The Costs and Benefits of Children:

A Synthesis

Neoclassical economic approaches and those based upon a critical
analysis of patriarchy grow out of two distinct paradigms of social thought.
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that they merely represent two different
answers to the same question.

Each approach asks a different set of

questions, and both sets are relevant.

Neoclassical models single out

household specific factors which affect the productivity and earnings of
women and children.

Institutional approaches, such as Caldwell's, explore

factors which affect the bargaining power of women and children--their
capacity to fullycapture and control the product of their labor.
It is useful to reformulate the insights of the institutional approach
in such a way as to clarify their role in a theory of the costs and benefits
cf children.

One of the distinctive points of the patriarchal control hy

pothesis is that parents must anticipate how much their children will
transfer to them as well as how much they will produce.

The timing of inter

generational transfers places children in a very strong position.

They

receive transfers when they are young, transfers that are unrelated to
their historical contribution.

If these transfers are completed by the

time they reach adulthood, children have no material incentive to repay
them.
This point is stated quite clearly by Charles Tilly:

"Children will

be more likely to satisfy their parents' childbearing motives during their
parents' lifetimes if the children themselves receive contingent guarantees
30
of return from the family property or the household enterprise.•

This

hypothesis does not imply that children would refuse to provide their parent.s
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with some pecuniary transfers in the absence of such "contingent guaran
t:ees."

There are a number of reasons why they might do so.

Family members

do represent a relative community of interest in which a certain sense
of reciprocity often prevails.

Particularl y in contexts where family

members are engaged in direct struggles for subsistence and survival they
are likely to recognize the advantages of collectivit y and cooperation . 31
In the second place, children obviously recognize that they will some day
become parents, and are unlikely to pursue strategies which might ultimate
ly weaken their position vis a vis their own children.
The conflict of interest between parents and children over the dis
position of family income is muted by the fact that they are interdepend ent.

Parents must take into account both their children's future productivit y

and their loyalty and obedience.

The fact that they receive economic

benefits from children does not necessarily motivate them to rear as many
children as possible.

They may be better off, given the quantity of land,

capital, or resources that they could own, to reduce family size so that
their children's endowments are not diluted. 32 · If mortality falls, parents
are likely to recognize that the increase in surviving children will affect
the family's economic lifecycle, and to respond accordingly .
The patriarchal control hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the
neoclassica l economic claim that parents take into account the "quality"
of children as well as the quantity.

dimension:

It merely introduces an additior.al

An increase in a childs' education will improve the economic

welfare of the entire family only if the child actually transfers some of

its own gains back to the family.
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Similarly, analysis of forms of patriarchal control over women does
not preclude the importance of household specific factors, such as education
and wealth.

Rather, it looks beyond these household specific factors to

society-wide institutions which enforce sexual inequality.

Neoclassical

economists underestimate the importance of sex-based discrimination and
exploitation not only because they conflict with the vision of free choice
within the market, but also because they deem them "irrational"--inconsist
ent with social optimality.

From the point of view of society as a whole, patriarchal domination
of women is inefficient.

It limits women's potential contribution to

society and impedgs efficient allocation of resources.

But a set of

institutions which appears irrational from n nocinl point of view mny
quite effectively· serve the interests of one group.

The individual male

head of household may be adversely affected by those forms of patriarchal
control that lower women's wages and restrict them to certain forms of work. But
if these same forms of patriarchal control lea? to a lengthening of women's
working day, the losses can easily be outweighed by the gains.
One way of summarizing the joint effect of household specific and
institutional factors upon the costs and benefits of children is to formu
late a simple mathematical model.

The patriarchal control variables are

svmbolized bv Greek letters.
The net cost of a child can be expressed as the difference between
the total costs of rearing a child and the total economic benefits of a
child.
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Let C = total lifetime costs
T

B • total lifetime benefits
T

CN • net costs

Let us examine the detenninants of CT, totaJ lifetime costs, and P,T, total
lifetime benefits, in turn.
Total lifetime benefits, BT, are primarily determined by three factors:
the expectancy of the chilu, the income that he or she earns (or, in non
market production, the total value of the product), and the percentage of
that income which is remitted to parents.
Let R = child's lifetime earnings (or product)
y =

(2)

percentage remitted to parents

B = yR
T

Aey
account.

consideration of the benefits of children must take y into
Tne specific hypothesis which is suggested by the institution

al approach is that y _is a positive and increasing function of patriarchal
control over wealth.
The total costs of children may be expressed as the sum of direct
costs or purchased inputs such as food and clothing, and the opportunity
cost of time devoted to childcare.
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Let C

D

c0

a

direct costs

• oppor tunity cost

The total oppor tunity cost

c0

is the sum of the oppor tunity cost

the numbe r
for mothe rs and the oppor tunity cost for father s, weigh ted by
of hours which each spends in childc are.

Assume that the oppor tunity cost

home produ ction.
is equal to the wage and/or the value of margi nal produc t in
Let WF

= female wage or value of margi nal produc t

WM = male wage

or value of margi nal produ ct

NF=

numbe r of hours female spends in childc are

NH =

numbPr of hours male i:;pends jn c-.hild care

ion and occup a
The wage rate which women rece1v c is affect ed_by discri minat
tional segreg ation.

The value of women's home produ ction may be equal to or

greate r than the value of men's home produ ction.

But if they work longer

there is sex
hours than men in the home, which is likely to be the case if
than men's.
discri minat ion in the marke t, the margin al produ ct is lower
or margi nal
ratio of the female wage or margin al produ ct to the male wage
produ ct is likely to be less one.

The

-27-

The 6 coefficient is analogous to they coefficient .

It represents a measure

of patriarchal restriction s on women's economic and political power which is

likely to be inversely related to men's ownership and control of means of
production.

The smaller 6 the more women's time is undervalued as a result

of patriarchal ly enforced inequality!

As the value of women's time increases

relative to men's 6 approaches 1, the opporttmity cost of mother's time
increases, and the overall cost of children increases.

An increase in the

amount of time which men devote to childcare would have a similar effect,
increasing the total opportunity cost of time.
The net cost of children can now be stated in terms consistent with an
institution al approach
( 6)

C

N

= C
D

+

NW

MM

+

N

F

owN -

YR

Patriarchal control variables 6 and y are not mere abstraction s; they directly
affect women's perceptions of the costs and benefits of children.

This model

is clearly consistent with standard neoclassica l approaches in that it can
explain an increase in the net costs of a child even if the patriarchal
control variables are held constant.

Any increase in parents' wage rates and/or

productivit y WM and WF increases the costs of children, as does any increase
in expenditure s on food, clothing, and education, c . It is by no means clear,
0
however,tha t changes in technically determined factors such as direct costs
and increased productivit y will modify the net costs of children.

If increases

in parents' wages also signify increases in children's wages, and if increased
expenditure s on children (such as increased education) lead to higher productivit y

or child wages, R, the benefits should change along with the costs.
The net costs of a child can increase even if direct costs, productivit y
of child labor, and the average adult wage remain the same.

A decrease in y,

the percentage of child earnings remitted to parents or an increase in

6,
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women's wage or marginal product relative to men's, increases the net costs
of children.

Such changes could countervail changes in prices and wages.

Even if increases in education and life expectancy increase children's
potential contribution to parental income, changes in patriarchal control
may decrease their actual contribution.
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Towards a Theory of Patriarchy
By refusing to concede the importance of institutions and practices

which enforce social inequality, neoclassical economists have greatly limit
ed the scope of the new household economics.

But, by the same token, in

stitutionalists have failed to provide a satisfactory theory of the motives
and mechanisms' of patriarcl1al control.

Caldwell and others have fallen

prey to a tendency to describe patriarchy in diffuse terms which include
ideology, attitudes, and religion, without asking why individual men and or
certain social classes may benefit.

Nor have they fully explained "'1hy

and how patriarchal ideologies and institutions change over time.
Patriarchy takes~many forms.

But it is embedded in and reinforced

by political institutions and patterns of ownership and control of the means
of production.

Changes in political institutions and class structure do

not necessarily modify or eliminate patriarchy, but they do transform the
conditions of struggle between the generations, the sexes, and the economic
classes to which families belong.
One of the most striking and least explored findings of the Internatio~
al Value of Children Study is the fact that many respondents agreed that

children nowadays are less willing to support their parents in old age and
were less willing to give part of their wages to their parents "'1hen children
start working.

In Thailand, 63% of respondents felt this way; in Hawaii,

4lt, in Japan, 64%. 33

In all cases, a majority of respondents disapproved

of these changes.
One suspects that this finding has been summarily dismissed by most
researchers as a manifestation of the inevitable petulance of the elderly.
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It deserves rather more careful conside ration.

Charles Hohm has shown

that the governm ent impleme nted social security program s are associat ed
4
Yet Hohm and others tend to treat the
with lower levels of fertilit y?
ent.
advent of such program s as exogenou s to the process of economic developm
The patriarc hal control hypothe sis suggests that social security provisio ns
may be a response to the breakdow n of intergen erationa l transfer s from
young to old.

The young may seek to legitima te their new independ ence

by transfer ring their traditio nal burden to the state.

What are the factotst hat create this new independ ence?
institut ional factor is the expansio n of public educatio n.

One obvious
School attend

ance prolongs the period of time in which children are receivin g a net

transfe r from their parents and provides them with an endowment (of new
skills) early in the lifecyc lc.

It also tends to incre.8se the child's

mobilit y, making it more likely that he will find employm ent in an area
away from home.

Childre n's potenti al to contribu te to parenta l income is

increase d, but their actual contribu tion increasi ngly becomes a volunta ry
charitab le one rather than an automat ic, regular one.
One conspicu ous change in the class structu re is the gradual proleta riani
zation of the labor force which occurs in the course of economic develop ment.·
When male heads of househo ld lose control over their independ ent means of
product ion and become wage laborers , the value of the tangible property which
they can convey to their children is reduced .

Wage labor provides sons (and

to a more limited extent, daughte rs), with access to employm ent independ ent
of their fathers.

The effect of economi c developm ent upon class structur e> and, in
particu lar, on family farms and busines ses, has been studiou sly ignored
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Table 3
Employe rs and O,m Account Workers , and Unpaid f.qmily t-;orkcrs ~
. £8 a Percent age of the Total Labor Force

(1)

Employe rs and
Own Account ~orkers
As :Z of Total
Eulgari a, 1975
Hungary , 1975
Norway, 1977
Sweden, 1977
United States, 1977
Canada, 1978
Federal Repul:)li'.: of

Germany , 1976
Austria , 1977
India, 1971

Scychil les, 1977
Bclgiu:.1 , 1977
Dcm,~ark • J.977

Netherl ands, 1971
France, 1975
Singa 1,orc, 1977

Israel, 1977
Japan, 1977
1-fo 1 t· .n ,__ 1 0 7 -;

Chile, 1970
Arp,cr,tin .:i, 1"7U
Libyan Arab J ::r..Dhiriy a
Tunisia , 1975
El SalvadG r, 1971
Venczuc lH, 19 77
Cyprus, 1976
Mexico, 1977
Republi c of 1:orca, 1977
Fiji, 1976
Ecu.-idor , 1974
liondurc1 s, 1974
Indones ia, 1971
Thnilan u, 1976
Pnragu.1 y, 1972
BolivL1 , 1976
Philipp ines, 1976

*

.5
2.1
2.5

7.1
7.7
8.5
9.3
9.5
10.4
11.9
12.
12.1.
12.4
14.
14.1
15.3
15.9
18.6
20.4

(2)
Unpaid Family
Workers as%

(3)

Combinc:.-1.
Percent age

of tote!

3.3
.8

5.
3.2

5.8
7.9
12.7
11.7

30.

40, I+

3.

17.1

11.4

27.3

2.1.

· 22. 6
25.1
27.9

21.9

3.2

23.7
25.
26.
26.2
27.3
31.1
31.9
33.4
37.8
39.6

4.2
6.9
13.
53.1

111. 4

46. 5
54 .o

39.7

25.3

65.0

45.2
46.1
51, .2

11.7

57. 8

66.6

21.5

88.1

6.5
21.4

7.8
8.7

Intcrnat ionnl Lnhour Oq;::miz .'.ition, St-1tisti c.:1l Yearboo k, 19 78

31.9

39.
79.3

37.6
53.3

,.1. 2
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·35
by development theorists as well as by demographer s.

Maulden's and Berel-

son's review of twenty-four recent studies of conditions of fertility

decline in developing countries reveals only one which mentions class as
36
a significant variable.
Yet employers, own account workers, and unpaid
family workers tend to comprise a large portion of the labor force in
countries with high levels of fertility, as can be seen from Table 3.
Furthermore , changes in class structure are closely correlated with in
creases in Gross National Product, education, and percent urban, all
structural variables which are correlated with fertility decline.
The effects of institution al change and transformat ion of
class structure upon women are more difficult to ascertain.

the

Hale/female

lo.Tage differentia ls persist even in the most de•1eloped countries.

This is

only one of the reasons ~ily some scholars argue that patriarchal control
over women is essentially unaffected by capitalist development .37
argue, in fact

Some

that the advent of capitalism worsens women's position. 38

This argument overlooks the tremendous impact which fertility decline
has on the content of women's work.

.

When women invest a great deal of time

in childrearin g, part of the productivit y of their work lies in the ex
pected returns from their adult children's labor.

As these returns diminish,

a sexual division of labor which channels women into childbearin g and child
rearing becomes quite costly to individual families.

While men actively

resist changes which reduce the direct services which women provide them
with in the home, they cannot support wives who are neither producing
much nor "investing" time in productive children.

Women are increasing-

ly forced to seek forms of employment which are more directly productive.
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This does not automatically increase their bargaining power, since
the way in which they are integrated into wage labor is influenced by

patriarchy.
wages than

Women are willing to work in less productive jobs for lower
men because the sexual division of labor traditionally assigned

them menial tasks.

Male dominated trade unions tend to restrict wcmen' s

access to more lucrative forms of employment.

Capitalists are eager to

maintain that sexual division of labor in its new form because it serves
their larger goal of profit maximization. 39
Despite the persistence of inequality, however, the expansion of wage labor
reduces women's traditional economic dependence upon individual men and
provides individual women with more bargaining power within the household.
Economic opportunities can provjdp women with new freedoms, and women can
use those freedoms to support individual and collective political struggles
which in turn create new opportunities.

As women become wage workers, the

conditions of class struggle are th~mselves modified.
It is possible to trace

the ways in which this transformation

occurred in some areas of the now developed world. 40 There is, however,
little reason to believe that it will occur in the same way in areas of
the developing world today.

Dependent capitalist development is often

characterized by extreme polarization between modern and traditional sec
tors.

Most women place their families' struggle for subsistence over their

own personal needs.

Countries with governments that deny their citizens

the most basic political rights are unlikely to accede to feminist demands-
especially those which might improve the position of working women.

I

I

I

r-

-34-

It would be facile to suggest that economic dev~lopment automatically
improves the position of women and children.

But economic development does

modify those forms of patriarchal control which directly affect the costs and
benefits of children.
which

Caldwell correctly locates the institutional factors

affect fertility decisions in the "familial mode of production" and

explains that this familial mode is transformed by the transition to capitalism.
His argument points to the need for detailed historical and empirical analyses
of changes in class structure and state involvement in the education of the young
and the care of the elderly.

Changes in the social relations of family life

do not result from changes in wages and prices or new, "modern" tastes and
preferences.

They are the product of a process of struggle between generatior.s,

sexes, and classes, struggles which both affect and are affected by the transi
tion to capitalism.
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